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Microfinance, the provision of small individual and 
business loans, has witnessed dramatic growth, reaching 
over 150 million borrowers worldwide. Much of its 
success has been attributed to overcoming the challenges 
of information asymmetries in uncollateralized lending. 
Yet, very little is known about the optimal contract 
structure of such loans—there is substantial variation 
across lenders, even within a particular setting. This paper 
exploits a plausibly exogenous change in the liability 
This paper—a product of the Finance and Private Sector Development Team, Development Research Group—is part of 
a larger effort in the department to conduct policy-oriented research. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on 
the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at bzia@worldbank.org.  
structure offered by a microfinance program in India, 
which shifted from individual to group liability lending. 
The analysis finds compelling evidence that contract 
structure matters: for the same borrower, required 
monthly loan installments are 6 percent less likely to 
be missed under the group liability setting, relative to 
individual liability. In addition, compulsory savings 
deposits are 19 percent less likely to be missed under 
group liability contracts.Liability Structure in Small-scale Finance: Evidence from a Natural
Experiment
Fenella Carpena, Shawn Cole, Jeremy Shapiro, and Bilal Ziay
1 Introduction
Theory and evidence highlight nancial market imperfections as a central cause of poverty and a key
impedement to growth (Banerjee and Newman, 1993; Galor and Zeira, 1993; Rajan and Zingales,
1998). In theories of capital accumulation for example, nancial market imperfections inuence the
poor's ability to borrow for investments in education and physical capital. Additionally, in models
explaining entrepreneurship, information asymmetries and transaction costs prevent protable en-
treprenurial activities of the poor, who often have no collateral. Lack of access to nancial services
may thus play a crucial role in leaving many productive opportunities for the poor untapped, as
well as in generating persistent income inequality and lower growth (Beck et al., 2008).1
Micronance, the provision of credit, savings and other nancial services to low-income house-
holds and entrepreneurs, has exploded in popularity and coverage in recent years, particularly in
meeting the large unmet demand for nance (Morduch, 1999; Armend ariz de Aghion and Morduch,
2010). Emerging markets and developed economies alike, including the United States, now provide
micronance services through a variety of public and private channels. The growth of micronance
has been unprecedented: between 2004 and 2008, the sector's average annual asset growth rate
was 39%, reaching US$60 billion in total assets by the end of 2008 (Chen et al., 2010). A careful
evaluation of micronance in Banerjee et al. (2009) has also revealed that microcredit does have
important eects on business outcomes and the composition of household expenditure. The rapid
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1growth of micronance, along with its potential for promoting development, has attracted the inter-
est not only of governments, donors, and socially oriented investors, but of mainstream commercial
banks as well.
Perhaps the most celebrated feature of micronance is the group liability contract, a lending
methodology pioneered by the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh. Under this contract, loans without
collateral are extended to a group of borrowers whose members are jointly liable for each other's
repayment. Since groups form voluntarily and group members are responsible for paying o each
other's debts, borrowers have the incentive to screen risky clients, monitor their peers, and enforce
repayment. The success of this model with the Grameen Bank led to its replication in many
other countries around the world, with over 150 million individuals reached at the end of 2007
(Daley-Harris, 2009). This model is particularly important given that small rms suer most from
institutional weakness (Beck et al., 2005), and because the structure of the banking sector can have
important distributional impacts on growth (Cetorelli and Gambera, 2001).
While most micronance organizations use group liability, not all do so. On the one hand, group
liability may solve information asymmetry problems by leveraging social ties and the borrower's
knowledge about the community, and reduce monitoring costs to the lender by motivating borrowers
to monitor each other. On the other hand, social sanctions may be limited, bad clients may free-
ride on good clients, and borrower groups may collude against the lender. In addition to group
liability lending, many micronance programs also employ a variety of approaches to maintain high
repayment rates. For example, some programs implement frequent repayment schedules, progressive
lending, or require collateral substitutes. And yet, very little is known about the eciency of such
designs in ensuring repayment.
Indeed, the question of an optimal loan contract structure remains largely unanswered in both
the theoretical and empirical micronance literature. Theoretical studies have mainly focused on
explaining how and why group liability mechanisms work, oering competing predictions on its
benets, while the empirical literature lags behind the theory. An important exception is Gin e and
Karlan (2009), which reports on a eld experiments in the Philippines to test the eect of individual
versus group liability lending. Their analysis focuses on the importance of peer monitoring, and
nds no signicant dierence in default among individual and group borrowers. However, they
study existing group borrowers who convert to individual liability, and it is quite possible that the
2social ties and repayment discipline instilled by group monitoring remain intact even with a shift to
individual liability. Further, since they focus on pre-formed groups, they are not able to measure
or identify the presence or importance of screening in group liability contracts.
Identifying the impact of group liability on outcomes such as default rate is complicated by
the standard problems of selection and omitted variables bias. Individuals with dierent nancial
habits might choose to take one form of contract but not the other. Alternatively, lenders with
dierent levels of sophistication may attract dierent client mixes, and oer dierent contracts.
One cannot simply compare clients across lending contracts, since self-selection or other aspects of
the program may be the root cause of any observed dierences.
In this paper, we use a natural experiment to compare loan repayment and savings discipline
between group liability and individual liability contracts.2 Our empirical strategy takes advantage
of a change in lending policies of Saath, a non-government organization providing micronance
services in India. Saath switched from individual liability to group liability lending. This transition
was governed by a strict policy rule: after a particular date, all borrowers completing an individual
liability cycle were subsequently switched to group liability in their next loan. Individual liability
loan completion dates were distributed relatively uniformly throughout the year, which oers a
natural variation in switching of loan contracts. Thus, in July for example, individual liability
borrowers nishing a loan cycle would switch to group liability in the following loan, while those
whose loan cycle ended after July would remain under an individual contract setting until the end
of the cycle. This plausibly exogenous change was phased in over time, generating natural control
groups, and allows us to credibly identify the causal impact of group liability structure. Further,
since we have time series data both before and after group liability is introduced, we can study the
dynamics of group borrower formation.
Consistent with Ghatak (1999 and 2000), we nd evidence of assortative matching. Specically,
we nd that the formation of groups is endogenous to borrower risk types: safe borrowers are
signicantly more likely to form joint liability groups with other safe borrowers, even controlling
for other factors such as physical proximity.
Our main analysis focuses on loan performance and estimates the joint eect of assortative peer
matching and ex-post peer monitoring under group liability. We nd that group liability structure
2Throughout this paper, we use the terms \group liability" and \joint liability" interchangeably.
3signicantly improves repayment rates. In particular, clients are about 6% less likely to miss a
monthly repayment in the group liability setting relative to individual liability; this eect holds
even with individual xed eects. We also nd that there is greater discipline in monthly compulsory
savings deposits when clients have a group liability loan. Specically, compulsory deposits are about
19% less likely to be missed in the group liability setting. Our results provide the rst credible
evidence that group liability contracts improve upon individual liability, particularly in ensuring
repayment and increasing savings discipline among clients.
From a practical and policy perspective, our results are quite timely. Microlenders worldwide
are increasingly weakening joint liability in their lending approaches (Armend ariz de Aghion and
Morduch, 2010). For example BancoSol in Bolivia has shifted signicant proportions of its lending
portfolio from group to individual lending, and even the Grameen Bank has moderated its joint
liability clause, allowing defaulters to get back on track without invoking group pressure. Our
results suggest a careful rethinking of such policy direction.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the existing literature on
liability structure in micronance. Section 3 provides a background on the micronance program
we study, as well as the change in liability structure of its loan products. In Section 4, we provide
a description of the data and summary statistics, and discuss our empirical strategy and results in
Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 Predictions of Group Liability
A wealth of theoretical literature in micronance explores the mechanisms behind group liability
contracts, particularly on mitigating information asymmetries and enforcement problems. Stiglitz
(1990) shows that the group liability structure overcomes ex ante moral hazard, since it creates
incentives for group members to monitor each other's loans. Although group liability induces
borrowers to bear more risk, Stiglitz argues that the gains from monitoring exceeds this cost,
leading to improved borrower welfare. Similarly, Banerjee et al. (1994) study credit cooperatives
and underscore the role of peer monitoring. They describe a model where higher monitoring results
in higher borrower eort, and hence, a higher probability of project success.
Even if a project succeeds, however, borrowers may refuse to repay or may claim that the
4project failed to avoid repayment. This strategic default, or ex post moral hazard, is also captured
in several theoretical studies on group liability. For example, Besley and Coate (1995) provide
a model demonstrating that joint liability may harness social capital to increase a borrower's
willingness to repay. Moreover, they show that if social penalties are suciently severe, group
liability results in higher repayment rates than individual lending. Armend ariz de Aghion (1999)
likewise demonstrates that joint liability agreements may increase the lender's ability to elicit debt
repayments. It may also reduce the incidence of strategic default since borrowers may impose social
sanctions on the defaulter.
In addition to examining moral hazard, the theoretical literature investigates how joint liability
mitigates adverse selection. Ghatak (2000) describes a model under a scenario where borrowers have
ex-ante information about the riskiness of other borrower's investment projects, while lenders do
not. Joint liability then acts as a screening device inducing `assortative matching.' Borrowers with
safe investments will partner with other safe borrowers, leaving risky borrowers to form groups
with themselves. In the case where borrowers do not have full information about each other's
risk types, Armend ariz de Aghion and Gollier (2000) demonstrate that peer group formation may
still mitigate adverse selection. They describe a `collateral eect' where cross-subsidization among
borrowers acts as a collateral behind the loan, thus enhancing eciency.
These theoretical models, among others, have shown that group liability may improve repayment
rates through alleviating imperfections in the credit market. However, whether group liability
outperforms other contract structures remains an open question in the micronance literature.
For example, Besley and Coate (1995) point out in their model that group liability also creates
a negative incentive eect. If borrowers cannot repay as a group, then some group members will
not nd it worthwhile to contribute their share of repayment, even though they would have repaid
under individual lending. Rai and Sj ostrom (2004), on the other hand, argue that a system of
cross-reports which elicits information about borrower's projects does better than both group and
individual liability. With limited side contracting, such a system improves performance since it
reduces the deadweight loss of harsh punishments.
Inconclusive empirical evidence accompanies these ambiguous theoretical predictions. Some
empirical studies support the theoretical advantages of group liability. For instance, Wenner (1995)
considers a group credit program in Costa Rica, and nds that groups which screened members and
5used local information had lower rates of delinquency; in Bangladesh, Sharma and Zeller (1997)
show that groups that were formed through self-selection had better repayment rates. However,
both of these studies may suer from omitted variable biases or selection problems. Other studies
provide little empirical evidence for the theory: Wydick (1999) nds that in group lending in
Guatemala, social ties have limited impact on repayment and that borrowers are in fact more
tolerant with their friends; Ahlin and Townsend (2007) use Thai data to show that repayment
rates are negatively associated with social ties.
Only a handful of studies examine the merits of group liability relative to other contract struc-
tures. Fischer (2009) conducts a series of lab experiments with actual micronance clients and
provides evidence that contract structure aects project selection. Specically, he nds that group
liability increases risk-taking, relative to individual liability contracts, as borrowers free-ride on
the insurance provided by their partners. When project approval is required, however, risk taking
under group liability is lower than both individual liability and an equity-like contract in which
income is shared equally.
The most relevant study on repayment rates under dierent loan liability structures is Gin e and
Karlan (2009), who report evidence from a series of eld experiments in the Philippines. In the
rst, borrowers who had signed up under a group liability structure were converted to individual
liability, thus the authors can independently identify the peer monitoring eect under group liability
since both joint and individual liability groups previously underwent the same screening. However,
they cannot identify or rule out any impacts of screening with this methodology. In addition, the
group repayment and monitoring mechanisms may already be entrenched and dicult to undo
even with an indivdual liability structure. Their second experiment randomly introduced either
group or individual liability lending to new borrowers. However, the experiment was at the loan
center level and take-up was quite uneven between group and individual loan centers, resulting
in potential statistical power concerns. In both instances, they nd default rates are invariant to
contract structure.
Our paper complements Gin e and Karlan (2009) by examing optimal contract structure in an
alternative setting. While the original experiment in Gin e and Karlan (2009) focuses on moving
from group to individual liability contracts, we explore the reverse; that is, the shift from individual
to group liability. As such, we are able to study the dynamics of group formation and nd evidence
6on assortative matching.
The following section describes the setting and our empirical strategy in more detail.
3 Empirical Setting
Our partner institution, Saath, is a non-government organization based in Ahmedabad, India.
Founded in 1989, Saath implements development initiatives in slum communities, including health,
education, infrastructure improvement, job placement, and livelihood training programs. Addition-
ally, Saath provides credit and savings services to the urban poor through its Micronance Unit.
In 2009, Saath Micronance had over 6,400 active clients in 4 branches, with a savings portfolio of
INR 18 million (USD 390,000) and a loan portfolio of INR 19 million (USD 410,000).3
While Saath has provided mentoring support to community-based credit and savings groups
since the mid-1990s, its Micronance Unit was not formally established until 2002. In that year,
Saath integrated the credit and savings groups it previously mentored into its organization, as
well as registered them as cooperative societies with the Indian government. Saath also began
managing these credit and savings cooperatives at this time, giving way to the Saath Micronance
Unit. Today, Saath Micronance provides various nancial services to slum communities, including
voluntary savings accounts, compulsory savings accounts, and group liability loans.
3.1 Savings Products
Since its inception in 2002, Saath Micronance has been oering voluntary savings accounts to
its clients. These voluntary savings earn an interest of 6% per year and do not have a minimum
balance. As the name suggests, members are not obliged to make regular deposits in voluntary
savings accounts. Any amount may be deposited, but only six withdrawals per year may be made.
In November 2007, Saath Micronance initiated compulsory savings accounts among its mem-
bers. Specically, members are required to deposit INR 100 (USD 2) every month into compulsory
savings accounts, for the duration of their membership with Saath Micronance. Clients may with-
draw any amount from their compulsory savings at any time, as long as a minimum balance of INR
3,500 (USD 70) is maintained. Similar to voluntary savings, compulsory savings earn an interest
3Based on Saath's 2008-2009 Annual Report.
7of 6% per year. Any amount which the client deposits over the compulsory savings of INR 100 is
deposited in the client's voluntary savings account. The goal of the compulsory savings account is
to allow clients to build a nancial buer stock against adverse shocks. It also provides low-cost
capital to Saath Micronance. It is important to note that the compulsory deposits were mandated
of all borrowers, independent of the switch to group liability loans. Hence, all outstanding loans
under both individual and group liability were required to make compulsory deposits after Novem-
ber 2007. In the analysis section, we will compare the adherence to these compulsory deposits for
the same person as s/he moves from individual to group liability.
3.2 Loan Products
In addition to savings products, Saath Micronance provides loans for asset creation (e.g. house
repairs), production (e.g. business working capital), and consumption (e.g. health, social func-
tions). From its beginnings in 2002 until November 2007, Saath provided credit through individual
liability loans. Beginning in November 2007, Saath discontinued individual liability loans, oering
instead group liability loans to members applying for loans.
Under the individual liability loan model, a client was required to have been a member of Saath
for at least six months with a savings account in order to be eligible for a loan. Members could
borrow up to three times their savings account balance, at an interest rate of 18% per year.4 These
individual-liability loans generally require no collateral, however, each loan applicant must meet two
requirements. First, the loan applicant must have two \guarantors" who also have a savings account
with Saath. Second, the combined savings balances of the loan applicant and the two guarantors
must be greater than or equal to the loan amount applied for. Although guarantors are in principle
required to maintain these savings balances through the duration of the loan, in practice this rule
was not strictly enforced. Guarantors are not eligible for a loan until the loan they guaranteed
has been fully repaid, but loan repayment is the sole responsibility of the borrower. Borrowers are
required to make monthly installments which cover principal and interest. The monthly principal
installment is a xed amount, and since the interest rate is declining balance, the total installment
4Micronance organizations typically quote interest rates in one of two forms: \declining," the standard used in
developed markets, where the amount of interest due each period is calculated based on the interest rate and the
remaining principle, and \at," where the interest payments are calculated using the original principal amount. Thus
a 10% \at" rate is signicantly higher than a 10% \declining" rate. Saath quotes rates using the standard declining
balance approach.
8amount (principal plus interest) varies every month. If the borrower defaults, Saath reserves the
right to take the guarantors' savings.
With the group liability model, on the other hand, Saath extends credit to groups of individuals
at an interest rate of 24% per year. These groups form primarily through self-selection with joint
applications submitted to Saath. Groups are composed of three to six individuals, all of whom
must be Saath Micronance members. Within each group, several criteria must be fullled. First,
at least 50% of the group must have been Saath Micronance members for at least 6 months with
at least a savings account. Second, at least 50% of the group must be female. Third, relatives
or individuals from the same household are not allowed in the same group. And nally, loan
terms must be homogenous across group members; that is, the number of installments as well as
the monthly installment due dates must be the same, and the loan amount must not vary widely
within each group. As in the individual liability model, group liability borrowers are required to
make monthly installments for both principal and interest, although in this setting, total installment
amounts (principal plus interest) are equated every month. That is, unlike the individual liability
model where the monthly principal installment is the same every month, it is the total installment
amount that is made to be equal in the group liability setting. Before any loans are disbursed,
group members are also required to sign a \mutual agreement form," stating that they are liable to
pay each other's debt in the event of default or delinquency. Borrower groups who have defaulted
or are delinquent are no longer eligible to receive a next loan from Saath.
3.3 Shift from Individual to Group Liability
Saath's decision to shift from oering individual-liability to group liability loans in November
2007 was due to a change in the management's priorities. Saath wanted to lend to more people,
provide larger loan amounts, and expand its micronance operations geographically, but its lending
activities had become stagnant under the individual liability model. In particular, the \guarantors"
requirement for individual liability loans restricted credit eligibility, as Saath had already reached
a point where almost all of its members were either a borrower or a guarantor. Additionally,
savings clients were reluctant to stand as guarantors for another client's loans, and loan amounts
were limited to 3 times the total savings account balance of the borrower. Saath management
thus shifted to group liability loans to overcome the restrictions in its individual liability model.
9In terms of the models discussed above, the limited ability of Saath members to pledge savings
as a collateral prevented Saath from expanding, and it saw group liability as a way to solve this
problem. In the year following this change, Saath gained almost 800 new clients and increased its
reach from 11 to 20 wards.
The transition from individual liability to group liability loans was implemented with the fol-
lowing rule. Beginning in November 2007, all new loans disbursed were group liability loans; Saath
would no longer disburse individual liability loans. However, existing loans whose term lasted be-
yond November 2007 were unaacted. For example, individual liability loan clients who completed
their loan in February 2008 continued under the individual liability contract until then, and fol-
lowing February 2008 would receive a group liability loan should they borrow again. The date of
switching from individual to group liability was therefore determined by individual liability loan
completion dates. These completion dates and subsequent conversion to group liability loans were
distributed relatively uniformly throughout the year.
Although Saath's loan product moved from individual to group liability beginning in late 2007,
repayment collection protocol (e.g. place of repayment, frequency of collection) and salaries for
eld ocers remained similar across time in our dataset. An empirical concern for the analysis to
follow is whether Saath's policy shift from individual to joint liability was also accompanied by a
shift in their loan collection techniques. A survey of eld ocers conducted in June 2010 conrms
that in both individual and group liability settings, eld ocers collected loan installments at the
client's household or workplace every month. For group liability borrowers, Saath does not require
groups to designate one of its members as a \group leader," but in practice, almost all groups have
a leader who is in charge of collecting repayments from other members. Hence, among individual
borrowers, eld ocers visited each borrower, while among group borrowers, eld ocers typically
visit only the group leader's household. If any member of a particular borrower group fails to
make a scheduled payment, the eld ocer assembles all group members together, and collects the
installment amount from the other members as stipulated in the group liability contract. Both
individual liability borrowers and joint liability borrower groups in default are not granted any
loans in the future. In addition, over the period we study, there was no change in wages among
eld ocers, who continued to receive a xed monthly sum.5
5After March 2009 eld ocers received 1% of the loan interest they collect. Surveys of eld ocers indicate that
10Overall, there are only two dierences between Saath's individual and group liability loans: rst,
the interest rate, which increased from 18% to 24% (declining balance) per year; and second, the
required total monthly installment amounts (principal plus interest), which varied slightly month
to month in the individual liability model but was constant in the group liability setting. In our
main analysis on loan repayment and savings discipline, we will focus only on individuals who
converted to group liability loans, exploiting the timing of their switch. By doing so, our empirical
design accounts for any self-screening based on the increase in interest rates between the two loan
contracts.
4 Data Collection and Summary Statistics
In this study, we use data from Saath Micronance's administrative software systems. The loan
data cover outstanding loans every month from April 2005 through March 2009. Since the change
in the type of loan contract occurred in November 2007, the data contain over two years of monthly
data on individual liability loans and over one year on group liability loans. Data are available
electronically from only 2 out of 4 Saath Micronance branches, Behrampura and Vasna, and we
focus on these. They are the two largest branches, and the oldest, accounting for the vast majority
of Saath's clients.
The data were maintained for accounting purposes, recording cash owing in and out of each
branch. They are therefore of very high quality. They do not, however, contain information on the
terms of each loan, such as maturity dates, installment amounts, and amounts outstanding. These
data were recorded by loan ocers in client passbooks and administrative ledgers. As a result, we
are unable to look at overdue amounts, prepayments, and other similar measures.6
While the data on loans cover April 2005 to March 2009, the savings data were only avail-
they were not aware of this change in compensation structure before it occured. Nevertheless, to isolate the focus of
our study on contract structure, we exclude months after March 2009 in the analysis.
6The loan data come from three software systems which Saath Micronance has used at dierent points in time.
Each of the two branches in our dataset used a separate system until early 2008, when the current system was
introduced in both branches. Because client identiers were not carried over from one software system to another,
we had to rely on using client names to track individuals over time. These names were unique since they included
rst, middle, and last names. In identifying clients across systems, 80% of the clients had exact name matches, while
14% had to be matched by hand due to name spelling errors. The remaining 6%, on the other hand, could not be
matched to the current software system. It is likely that these clients have withdrawn their membership with Saath
Micronance and therefore have not borrowed under the group liability setting, since Saath migrated information
from the previous to the current software system only for existing members.
11able from January 2008 to March 2009. The savings data include monthly aggregate deposit and
withdrawal amounts, for compulsory savings accounts.
As previously described, in our main analysis we study borrowers who have received both
individual and group liability loans to overcome the selection problem. Hence, in our dataset, these
clients begin with an individual liability loan, and after November 2007, receive a group liability
loan. Within Saath's Behrampura and Vasna locations, we nd a sample of 276 such clients,
representing 22% of the loan client base in these two branches as of March 2009.
Table 1 provides summary statistics for our sample. Collectively, these clients received a total
of 748 loans from Saath, 450 of which are individual liability loans and 298 are group liability
loans. The average individual liability loan amount is about INR 10,000 (USD 220), and about
INR 18,000 (USD 390) for group liability loans. Figure 1 plots the number of group liability
loans that are disbursed over time. As the gure shows, the borrowers in our sample, all of whom
received individual liability loans, switched to group liability loans at varying months. Our empirical
strategy takes advantage of this staggered timing, comparing individual liability loan clients who
have already received group liability loans to future recipients, to identify the impact of group
liability on loan repayment behavior and savings discipline.
5 Empirical Strategy and Analysis
5.1 Empirical Strategy
Our rst empirical tests measure the extent of assortive matching, using two complementary sets of
analysis. First, we use a simple regression framework. For each individual i who belongs to a joint
liability borrower group, we dene a measure of `reliability,' ri, (discussed in greater detail below),




where NGi is the number of borrowers in the group Gi of which i is a member). We thus regress:
yi =  + ri + "i (1)
clustering standard errors at the borrower-group level.
Our second measure is based on a permutation test. We rst randomly assign members into
12groups, keeping the original distribution of group sizes.7. We estimate the coecient  from
Equation (1) on this set of randomly assigned individuals. We repeat this exercise 10,000 times
and plot the distribution of coecients. We then compare the actual coecient to the distribution
generated at random.
To study the eect of contract structure on lending outcomes, we exploit the natural experiment
provided by Saath's change in policy. The presence of an exogenous policy change is important.
Without exogenous variation, it would be very dicult to know whether dierences in outcomes
were attributable to contract structure, or any number of other unobservable characteristics of
borrowers or lending institutions. Indeed, theory predicts that dierent contracts will be optimal
for dierent types of borrowers.
To overcome this selection problem, we focus our attention to borrowers of Saath who received
both individual and group liability loans. We exploit the natural phasing-in of group liability, in
what amounts to a repeated dierence-in-dierence framework. At any particular point in time, our
\treatment" group then consists of clients who have fully repaid their individual liability loan and
currently have a group liability loan, while our \control" group consists of individual liability loan
clients who will eventually convert to a group liability loan. Specically, we estimate the following
equation:
yilt =  + Til + i + t + ilt (2)
where the subscript i refers to individuals, l refers to loans, and t refers to months. T is a dummy
variable equal to 1 if loan l of client i is a group liability loan, and 0 if it is an individual liability
loan. yilt is a measure of loan repayment or savings discipline. The estimate of  then provides the
eect of switching to group liability loans for individuals who are already borrowing. We include
time eects t since conversion to group liability loans was staggered across individuals, and the
individual xed eects i absorb time-invariant characteristics of each borrower.
5.2 Self-screening and Assortative Matching
Section 2 discusses the theoretical underpinnings of how self-selected groups may be formed under a
joint liability setting. The theory predicts self-sorting and matching of the same types of individuals;
7In the data, we observe 12 groups of size 3, 123 groups of size 4, 37 groups of size 5, and 6 groups of size 6.
13specically, Ghatak (2000) predicts assortative matching where safe borrowers form groups with
other safe borrowers.
Following the change in contract structure, individuals were obliged to form groups, but were
free to choose their own group members. Table 2 presents evidence on assortative matching among
Saath micronance clients, using a variety of measures of borrower quality. Since many group loan
members in this analysis are rst-time borrowers who never previously held an individual liability
loan, we cannot use past loan repayment or default data as a measure of borrower quality. However,
we do observe compulsory savings data for everyone since, as per Saath regulation, every applicant
must have a compulsory savings account with Saath for at least six month prior to applying for a
loan. For this reason, our borrower quality measures are based on savings rather than loan data.
In columns (1) to (3) of Table 2, the `reliability' of a borrower is dened as the proportion
of compulsory savings deposits that were missed before the group liability loan; columns (4) to
(6) dene `reliability' as a dummy variable equal to 1 if any past compulsory savings deposit was
missed. Under both these denitions of reliability, we nd strong evidence of assortative matching,
that is, we nd that the average reliability of group members is strongly and positively associated
with the borrower's own level of reliability. This result is robust across specications, and holds
even when we include neighborhood xed eects.8
As a further test of assortative matching, Figure 2 plots the distribution of the regression
coecient on own reliability level from 10,000 randomly formed group combinations. The idea
behind this exercise is to simulate the reliability prole of groups if they were truly randomly
formed with no endogenous matching. The red dot represents the regression coecient that we
observe in our data. As is clearly evident, our observed coecient is on the extreme right tail of
all the distributions we plot, conrming that borrower self-screening is at play in group formation,
even controlling for physical proximity.
While the analysis above suggests a strong self-screening mechanism within joint liability groups,
we cannot distinguish how much more informative this screening is than what Saath could have
achieved through its own devices. We do, however, note that everyone in our sample had already
been approved by Saath for a loan; the strong evidence of sorting even within this group suggests
8As a third denition of `reliability', we consider a dummy for whether the client missed the compulsory savings
deposit in the month prior to receiving a group liability loan, and obtain similar results.
14borrowers may have substantial inside information about each other's quality.
5.3 Loan Repayment
We now turn to the critical question of loan repayment. We note that the joint liability structure
will in theory induce both better screening (demonstrated above), but also greater monitoring
eorts. Our empirical design does not distinguish between the two potential causes of improved
repayment, but rather estimates the combined causal eect.
Table 3 presents OLS estimates of Equation 2, where the outcome of interest is a dummy
variable for a missed payment. This dummy variable indicates whether the client failed to make
a repayment for a particular month. Saath Micronance clients are required to make monthly
repayments until the principal balance is paid in full, beginning 30 days following disbursement.
Hence, the dependent variable takes on the value 1 for a particular month if the total amount
repaid by the borrower for that month is nil, and 0 otherwise. We use this dummy variable as our
rst measure of monthly loan repayment discipline.
In our sample, almost 20% of individual liablity and only 0.1% of group-liabilty monthly loan
repayments were not made. Our results in Table 3 indicate that under the group liability contract,
monthly loan repayments are about 6% less likely to be missed relative to individual liability, signif-
icant at the 5% level. Controlling for other factors such as time trends and individual characteristics
does not aect these results.
As a further robustness check, we conduct a direct \falsication" test of our analysis by using
data from our clients' previous individual-to-individual loan renewals. The sample is reduced since
many clients did not have multiple individual loans in the past. Table 4 presents these results and
shows no signicant eect on missed payments.
Another concern over our empirical strategy is in the sample selection; since our sample consists
of individual liability clients who chose to renew their borrowing under the group liability setting,
these clients may be better at repayment than borrowers who did not want to enter into a group
liability loan contract. However, our analysis focuses exclusively on those who renew, and includes
individual xed eects. Hence, an interpretation of our results is that even \good" clients exhib-
ited higher repayment discipline under the group liability setting, in comparison to the individual
liability setting.
15Yet another concern is that a client's propensity to repay may be correlated with the time in
the loan cycle. Specically, clients may be more likely to make repayments towards the end of the
cycle on their individual liability loan, so that they may become eligible for a group liability loan
in the future. We note that this would bias estimates against nding that group liability improves
borrower performance. Nevertheless, we investigate this possibility using an event-time regression
with the dependent variable for missed payment as previously described, where the event is the
conversion from an individual liability to a group liability-loan.
Figure 3 plots the coecients for each event-time dummy. The rst month of repayment in the
group liability setting is at time = 0, the nal repayment month in the individual liability loan is at
time =  1, the second to the last individual liability loan repayment month is at time =  2, and
so on. Thus, the gure describes loan repayment behavior under the individual liability contract,
before switching to group liability. Saath requires its borrowers to pay their current loan in full
before they are given a next loan, so by denition, all clients in our sample made a repayment at
time =  1. Examining the periods where time   2 shows no pattern supporting the idea that
clients strategically repaid their individual liability loan so that they may borrow under the group
liability setting.
On the other hand, it might also be the case that clients are more likely to make repayments
early on than towards the end of the loan cycle. For example, clients may have more liquidity to
repay immediately following loan disbursal, but become less able (or willing) to pay as the loan
matures. We examine this possibility, again using an event-time regression, as shown in Figure
4. We estimate how repayment rates change around loan renewal times when an client pays o
an individual liability loan and renews for another individual liability loan (blue line), and for the
cases when a client pays o a group liability loan and renews for a second group liability loan (red
line). Note that the rst month of repayment in the second loan cycle is at time = 0, and the nal
repayment in the rst loan cycle is at time =  1. Similar to Figure 3, at time =  1, all clients
made a repayment by denition, so the missed payment dummy must mechanically equal zero. To
control for any possible eects of maturity on repayment, we include `loan age in months' (i.e., the
number of months which have passed since the loan was disbursed), as an explanatory variable in
Columns (3) and (4) of Table 3. The point estimate on the group liability loan dummy remains
statistically signicant. Figure 5 further shows that prior missed payments are uncorrelated with
16the calendar month of loan origination.
Finally, the outcome we have considered thus far, whether the client missed a loan installment
for a particular month, is a rough measure since repayments may be partial. That is, a client
may have repaid an amount greater than zero, but this amount may be less than the required
installment amount. Another measure of repayment discipline then is the standard deviation of
principal amount repaid for individual liability loans, and total amount repaid for group liability
loans. As described in Section 3, the principal installment amount was xed in the individual
liability setting, whereas in group liability, the required total installment amount (principal plus
interest) was equated every month. If the required amount is repaid each month, then the standard
deviation would be zero. However, if there are many months where people pay less or more than
the required amount, then the standard deviation would be higher. Table 5 provides OLS estimates
where the dependent variable is the standard deviation of repayment. Again, our estimates show
that there is greater loan repayment discipline in the group liability setting, relative to individual
liability.
Given these results, a natural question that arises is why group liability outperforms individual
liability for clients who are already borrowing. Although the guarantors requirement in individual
liability contracts provided incentives for guarantors to monitor loans and enforce repayment, these
incentives in practice were quite weak: the microlender rarely seized the savings of guarantors
of defaulting clients, and did not strictly enforce that guarantors maintain their savings account
balance. The microlender collected repayment from the guarantors only if all other options (e.g.
seizing the defaulting borrower's savings, revisiting the defaulting borrower, threatening to charge
penalties, rescheduling the loan, having the branch manager intervene) have been exhausted. In
contrast, the group liability structure strengthens cooperation and trust among group members,
as indicated by the fact that almost all joint liability borrower groups designate a group leader
even though it is not required. It is possible that having a group leader increases incentives for
monitoring and enforcing repayment. For example, having a group leader perhaps creates a person
of authority who can enforce repayment or impose sanctions in the event of default.
175.4 Savings Discipline
We now turn our attention to the compulsory savings deposits required by Saath. We might expect
that savings discipline is higher in the group liability setting, since compulsory savings may act as
a form of insurance when a group member defaults.
Although Saath initiated both a shift to group liability lending and compulsory deposits at the
same time in November 2007, we can uniquely identify the eect of group liability on compulsory
savings by exploiting the time-series variation in loan renewals. Specically, while the compulsory
savings were mandated across the board for all borrowers post-November 2007, the shift from
individual to group liability was more staggered, depending on when each individual loan term
expired. As explained earlier, these renewals were distrubted relatively uniformly throughout the
year. Hence, we can study the adherence to compulsory savings for the same person who was
borrowing under an individual liability contract post November 2007, and who eventually converted
to a group liability contract.9
Table 6 presents OLS estimates where our dependent variable is a dummy for missing a com-
pulsory savings deposit. The dependent variable takes on the value 1 if the client deposited less
then INR 100, and 0 otherwise. Our results indicate that the same borrower exhibits greater sav-
ings discipline when in a group liability loan than when in an individual liability loan: compulsory
savings depoists are about 19% less likely to be missed in the group liability setting, signicant at
the 5% level.
6 Conclusion
Micronance has reached over 150 million borrowers worldwide, and is growing at a 40 percent
cumulative average growth rate. Recent initial public oerings (IPOs) which valued the Mexican
micronance institution Compartamos at $2 billion, and SKS in India at $1.5 billion, have attracted
the attention of global nancial markets. Yet, there have also been spectacular failures, such as the
collapse of Banco del Exito (BANEX), which with a $125 million dollar loan portfolio was recently
the largest micro and small and medium enterprise lender in Nicaragua. Suering from a 45 percent
9Since we only have savings data from January 2008 onwards, we cannot study the eect of compulsory savings
under the individual liability setting as we have no pre-period data (i.e. savings data pre-November 2007).
18delinquency rate, it was ordered into liquidation.10
As many microlenders around the world weaken their group liability approach and shift towards
individual lending, understanding the role of group liability in enhancing performance has become
a critical question in micronance programs, moving forward. Yet, the empirical literature provides
little guidance for policy makers and micronance practitioners, since few empirical studies have
examined group liability contracts with other lending strategies.
In this paper, we exploit an exogenous change in liability structure in an Indian micronance
program, where the program shifted from individual liability to a group liability structure. We
nd evidence that for the same borrower, the shift to group liability reduces default rates and
improves savings discipline. Under the group liability setting, required monthly loan installments
are 6% less likely to be missed and compulsory savings deposits are about 19% less likely to be
missed, relative to individual liability. Thus, our ndings indicate that group lending outperforms
individual lending in loan repayment and savings discipline.
The microlender we study, Saath, has operations that are fairly typical of MFIs that lend in
urban areas. Overall, our results suggest that group liability in micronance may be a particularly
eective contract in improving repayment behavior, especially for clients who are already borrowing.
A promising avenue for further research is to study the precise mechanisms for this improved
behavior, that is, the relative merits of peer screening versus peer monitoring under group liability
contracts. Further, if peers are indeed eective screeners or monitors, an open research question
is whether group liability contracts can be made even better, perhaps by introducing some formal
group or sub-group level repayment incentives or insurance mechanisms.
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Behrampura 198 512 303 9959.646 209 19081.34
Vasna 78 236 147 9927.211 89 16764.04







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































27Figure 1: Group Liability Loans Disbursement in Sample
This gure plots the number of group liability loans that are disbursed over time in our sample. All
borrowers are previously individual liability borrowers, who subsequently received a group liability
loan after the policy change.
28Figure 2: Group Formation under Joint Liability
These gures plot the distribution of the coecient on the client's own reliability level, from the
regressions in Columns (1), (3), (4) and (6) of Table 2, if borrower groups are randomly formed.
The distribution comes from 10,000 iterations. The red dot represents the point estimate observed.
Figures in the left column are from regressions which include all group liability loan clients. Figures
in the right column are from regressions which include group liability loan clients who belong to a
borrower group where all group members live in the same neighborhood, focusing on neighborhoods
where there is more than one such group. These gures represent dierent denitions of reliability,
as indicated below.
(a) Reliability Dened as Proportion of
Compulsory Savings Missed Before JLG
Loan Starts (All Groups)
(b) Reliability Dened as Proportion of
Compulsory Savings Missed Before JLG
Loan Starts (Within Neighborhood)
(c) Reliability Dened as Whether You
Missed Any Compulsory Deposit Before JLG
Loan Starts (All Groups)
(d) Reliability Dened as Whether You
Missed Any Compulsory Deposit Before JLG
Loan Starts (Within Neighborhood)
(e) Reliability Dened As Whether You
Missed The Compulsory Deposit In The
Month Before JLG Loan Starts (All Groups)
(f) Reliability Dened As Whether You
Missed The Compulsory Deposit In The
Month Before JLG Loan Starts (Within
Neighborhood)
29Figure 3: Event Time Regression: Missed Payment on
Event Time Dummies of Switching from Individual to Group Liability Loan
This gure plots coecients for event-time dummies where the event is the conversion from indi-
vidual liability to a group liability loan. The dependent variable is a dummy for missing a monthly
repayment, which takes on the value 1 for a particular month if the total amount repaid by the
borrower for that month is nil, and 0 otherwise. The rst month of repayment in the group liability
setting is at time = 0, the nal repayment month in the individual liability setting is at time =  1.
The dashed lines indicate the 95% condence interval.
(a) No Controls
(b) With Month FEs
30Figure 4: Event Time Regression: Missed Payment on
Event Time Dummies of Switching from the First to the Second Loan Cycle
This gure plots coecients for event-time dummies where the event is the shift from the client's
rst loan cycle to the second loan cycle, for each of the individual and group liability loans. The
dependent variable is a dummy for missing a monthly repayment, which takes on the value 1 for a
particular month if the total amount repaid by the borrower for that month is nil, and 0 otherwise.
The rst month of repayment in the second loan cycle is at time = 0, the nal repayment month
in the rst loan cycle is at time =  1. The dashed lines indicate the 95% condence interval.
(a) No Controls
(b) With Month FEs
31Figure 5: Calendar Month of Loan Origination and Missed Payments
This gure plots the percentage of monthly repayments that were missed, using the rst three
repayments from loan disbursement of the client's most recent individual liability loan. The calendar
month of loan origination refers to the calendar month when the loan was disbursed. The size of
the bubbles represent frequencies. The red line represents the best-t line. The sample includes
clients who received both an individual and a group liability loan.
32